The Lisbon approach to on-street parking management

Soft Enforcement

Helsinki, September 20th, 2012

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On Street Parking Players

Who receive income from On-Street?

- City Authorities

- Concessions
  - Public or Private Company

Who receive income from Enforcement?

- City

- Police

- Central Government

- Concessions
  - Public or ~~Private Company~~

On Street Parking Players

Enforcement

Alignment of Incentives	Who Receives Money From Enforcement			
	Government	Police	City	Operator
Police	-	+++	+	- -
Local Authority	-		+++	- -
Operator	+		++	+++

Who enforces (row header for Police / Local Authority / Operator)

On Street Parking Players

First Portuguese Concession

* Income from on street divided between city and private.
* Enforcement to be made exclusively by Police at a local level.
* Income from enforcement divided by government and Police central organization.

On Street Parking Players

First Concession Complete Mismatch

- Concessionaire received 0.
- City received 0.
- Space was occupied, unavailable to other drivers.
- Enforcers received 0 and dislike the activity.
- Driver had a very low probability of paying a fine to the Government.

X

On Street Parking Players

Police didn´t like to enforce

- Low dignity activity.
- No incentives for local police departments.
- Citizens frown upon vigilance activity.
- Enforcers accused to work on behalf of private companies

Average Payment: 2€   Probability of being fined:<1%
Fine : 60€ – 90€   Expected value of non compliance: 1,25€

Soft Enforcement

Who is he?

- Someone with no coins in his wallet?

- An old man going to buy urgent medicine?

- Someone distracted?

- A millionaire soccer player having lunch in a fancy restaurant?

- Someone who refuses to pay for parking, always take a chance?

Soft Enforcement

Situation	Goal
Concessionaire received 0.	The driver owes money to the concessionaire, not to the government. A debt is generated.
Space was occupied, unavailable to other drivers.	All occupied spaces must generate revenue.
Enforcers received 0 and dislike the activity.	Enforcement job should be made more attractive.
Driver had a very low probability of paying a fine to the Government.	Driver should have a high probability of paying the 'debt' to the concessionaire.
Fines are unfair in many situations	Penalty should be proportional to the "crime".

Soft Enforcement

Why soft?

- No clamps, no fines.
- Acceptable values.
- Ask politely – you owe us.
- No menaces.
- Easy pay system.

8€

90€

Soft Enforcement

Who enforces?

- Soft Enforcement is made by people who's job is to enforce.
- Hard enforcement remains with Police or authorized public entities.

8€

90€

X

What if…. same License Plate is caught second time?

- Ask politely, again… for the double. You didn't pay, twice. Show dates and ask for cumulated debt.
- Still no menaces.

8€

16€

2€

What if … same license plate is found third time?

- Ask politely, again… for the triple.

- Alert for consequences…

16€

24€

2€

- After a limit is reached, call hard enforcement authority.

Soft Enforcement

Police reaction to the proposed system:

- No more chasing of unlucky drivers.

- No more check parking time on display.

- No more insults from citizens.

- Feel confortable to act against persistent offenders – that's their job!

Soft Enforcement

Other characteristics of the system:

- After debt payment, at any time, records are clean.
- If authorities don't answer request for hard enforcement, debt will keep increasing.
- Black lists available.
- When police acts, drivers may pay not only the fine, but also outstanding debt. If they don't pay, record is not clean.

- Strong statistical data base for every street of the city.
- GPS control of enforcers.
- Automatic on-line requests for authorities.

Soft Enforcement

Citizen reaction to the proposed system was very good.

- The alerts system is seen as an additional payment method sometimes called post-payment.

- Don't need to worry if time expired or no coins available.

- Very low level of complaints.

- Easy acceptance of the amounts asked.

Lisbon Example

- The system was implemented in Lisbon in June 2005, by EMEL, the public operator of Lisbon.

- Soft enforcement made by private company.

- Hard enforcement made by EMEL (clamp, tow away, fines).

Lisbon Example

Alignment of Incentives	Who Receives Money From Enforcement			
	Government	Police	City	Operator
Who enforces Police	-	+++	+	--
Local Authority	-		+++	--
Operator	+		++	+++

Lisbon Example

Income more than doubled, only 3 months after start-up.

Currently 15 000 spaces operated with SIAF.

Crew of 100 soft enforcers from Private Company

10 teams of hard enforcement from EMEL, 3 Tow Away vehicles.

Lisbon Example

- Incompliance levels reduced to less than 5%.

- Recovery levels accounts for only 8% of the income.

- Hard enforcement needed for less than 1% of the occurrences.

- Very low complaint level (less than 1% of payment requests, 0,3% accepted).

- EMEL received an EPA award for the Lisbon On-Street Management System.

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